Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63ff7672470b12dc…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.51 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: df0c1f3d60141f6a0761588194f42057 SHA-1: d435bdfae3c8f80d105a4649c0d336488593a4ea SHA-256: 63ff7672470b12dc780b802d96534af0b33e047b020ec34541350db987f4a005
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The presence of the Ole10Native stream and the objupdate heuristic further confirm the exploitation attempt.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2{

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0015fae3.bin
5cbd5a0c4640f6bba982c183755de922469c3d3c5006770377fcc699fb0c76ac
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15FAE3 3732 bytes