MALICIOUS
270
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample is an OLE document with a significant slack space anomaly, indicating potential obfuscation or embedded content. It contains an embedded PE executable and an embedded SWF (Flash) object, strongly suggesting it acts as a dropper for a secondary malicious payload. The VBA macros themselves do not contain executable statements but reference controls for ShockwaveFlash, further supporting the presence of Flash content. The embedded executable is the primary IOC.
Heuristics 8
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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Embedded Adobe Flash (SWF) in OLE document critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_SWFDocument contains an embedded Adobe Flash (SWF) object. Vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-4878 and CVE-2018-15982 involved Flash objects embedded in Office files. Adobe Flash has been end-of-life since December 2020.
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 135,536 bytes but its declared streams total only 18,407 bytes — 117,129 bytes (86%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtin
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/WinIntPCA.crl0U
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftWinIntPCA.crt0
- http://update.microsoft.com/windowsupdate
- http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0H
- http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0
- http://www.microsoft.com/windows0
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basa4437065eec84f88ff355b97d8611ccfb25f1b88dcdb05d0b8745564ec078a06 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1074 bytes |
embedded_office_00005c00.exefc34c13b246b341416efec6096403ff8559088f2724b7400bc841eaf45db7ee3 |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x5C00 | 111984 bytes |
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