Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63ef2b48a009905d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

152.5 KB
MD5: 650acd51d348844f35fd974812bf293b SHA-1: 6b350f0b1675e57422a7abdbfff442b74cf85204 SHA-256: 63ef2b48a009905d09cd6c2fc6ed26afaa244d9624c0d09444e1ac394edac416
300 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics related to WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, cmd.exe invocation, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The OLE structure also shows a significant slack space anomaly and an EMF object within an EPRINT stream, suggesting potential obfuscation or exploitation. The document body contains Chinese text related to file construction and embedded objects, but does not provide direct instructions or lures.

Heuristics 8

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 156,160 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 124,809 bytes (80%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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