RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 63e4f99b6ec33564

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

681.7 KB Created: 2021-03-23 09:43:00

MD5: 614679aaac8791504e5885c9c4e97b58 SHA-1: eb4fbcc84b0d5fe81bdae29c4561a3786c8c064a SHA-256: 63e4f99b6ec33564e2d77dcf30898904742f1f2823b5f93812354e11aa5ac99f

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, including OLE object data and explicit triggers for OLE activation. High-severity heuristics identify vulnerabilities CVE-2017-8759 and CVE-2026-21514, which are known to allow arbitrary code execution when the document is opened. This suggests the file is designed to exploit these flaws to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759

RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514

RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 9 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002ce7.bin` `8a017c17b7075ee07cb1883811a854a3ed042fe0d11edb7ab5e9ee05664c38bf`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2CE7	24635 bytes
`objdata_01_off0001473f.bin` `96191cfac62880a84588a0b9fe7b4e4ec0848d290638a1b64575888a26468c23`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1473F	24635 bytes
`objdata_02_off00026197.bin` `ec488a996a4ab908290eae1e0a25e319f2b2ab9f6fa91982a99d25373387fda5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x26197	24635 bytes
`objdata_03_off00037bef.bin` `543df9838a1ae148849ab2a3cec68df9938ae3aa8eb30e4c4325c07824226c3d`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x37BEF	24635 bytes
`objdata_04_off00049647.bin` `ef23adaf01638e367fe681db762c28997d42b2898d714eae38971329b5666061`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x49647	24635 bytes
`objdata_05_off0005b09f.bin` `ab5d283abb780bb13cd937d409a9442414b003dcd72d8c06d78d36d484385774`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5B09F	24635 bytes
`objdata_06_off0006caf7.bin` `0d9989a9905e110a0d5508b915f20c387d40687afec67a308b169b30beef8c43`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x6CAF7	24635 bytes
`objdata_07_off0007fbd3.bin` `cc052fedb73926e49ca78ce42513b346333006180a952372f019dd4e10471a65`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7FBD3	24635 bytes
`objdata_08_off0009162b.bin` `4754f0cac4dedd1aff6a1355379aa38408b35b53880b18cea812d351c3805b45`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x9162B	24635 bytes
`rtf_svb_0007e70f.zip` `366882e6fdbcd59074b2d34677683675916635cc14c7cb4447502d1461e3a131`	rtf-svb-package	RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x7E70F	1697 bytes

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