Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63ddba90ee665529…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 5c6385eb66b1af6192389d6d6392c459 SHA-1: cc90fc027d31567eca1780540789a20078db9d7b SHA-256: 63ddba90ee6655292c831608df2b5b8fd1035566d2c43b95ce37aac8ddd873c8
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine, often delivered via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ba.bin
2a588f12fa674e227c77d7d61522e9095b8fb05f47cdd9b8007df8a2357f41ed
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA 1697 bytes