Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63c8d38999d3c7af…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

5.0 KB
MD5: 4b069eb527f9f715e965af227c5f599c SHA-1: cbf7722ac1862009e9db6351205a3ae44567db83 SHA-256: 63c8d38999d3c7af568463d312f2fe4e8ff4eea75ed6399b11486af7b449f92e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. The specific exploit mechanism points to a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000cc.bin
d293de63f70223dcccd08bd24ac00ccd95e5a40c59b7eeab1a4587a931b3a94b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCC 2323 bytes