RTF malware analysis — malicious · 63c21a2af65e1fd7

MALICIOUS

RTF

86.4 KB First seen: 2024-09-02

MD5: 8ce06dc4ce1fa52f729607c6058f991c SHA-1: 52c42764e475ed408c5dd1198923f88a65a39078 SHA-256: 63c21a2af65e1fd730517ed1e444c0fcc4f2d9f76d3592c6e38e783af57e6a50

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as a vulnerable Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the object is designed to be activated automatically, likely triggering an exploit. This exploit is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, characteristic of a downloader or dropper malware.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000f8e.bin` `542311335c34c1dcb6c90d529af9b5669d3edcd9e5445618aa69a78e4d51255a`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xF8E	1761 bytes

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