Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63c0e8ee72f1440d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

72.0 KB Created: 2020-03-04 13:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 623f67fed2743e2916090c58b5c4b3c2 SHA-1: 2c802a42efe6ffd1c97ec2e0b4a27a3c3fa7f6e8 SHA-256: 63c0e8ee72f1440d0b54869aac76681c03dc15b22766d297d168d2a3c248206f
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'Document_Open' macro is configured to auto-execute upon opening, and it uses GetObject to launch a WMI process to create a new process. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to enable editing and content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware. The VBA code appears to be a downloader, as indicated by the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Generic-7609655-0'.

Heuristics 9

  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-7609655-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-7609655-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0ec6a126503bfa1eb9ed880d3d87db02a81d0e007e4e2c4e362bf6cced0c129c
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4901 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).