Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63bd62aeae10e4b5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.7 KB Created: 2020-09-30 02:51:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 9002393119bf3386239edb995a2f3b12 SHA-1: f393be774d373bde057477a14a5fe5f1e48f2c21 SHA-256: 63bd62aeae10e4b540e3eb7b13611a06f626885a78a35ac419179d2c7a88b651
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on disposable domains and appear to be part of a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. One prominent URL, 'https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=reading+egyptian+art+pdf', is explicitly flagged as a malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=reading+egyptian+art+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037152.mozfiles.com/files/1037152/60031358600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036678.mozfiles.com/files/1036678/41906903956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036977.mozfiles.com/files/1036977/salilosolotolepezub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.grantdemingneighborhood.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775678/zakebix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.chainofresponsibility-wa.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681556/3895540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wibuga.porterauthority.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871781/nuwevufevotijelatak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.impactarcheryclovis.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740277/guratiti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.wedding-flowers-perth.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070702/7896770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://luzalozu.tylerdsmith.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813747/makenabom_rimuzifepikokan_zixim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kentuckygrapplers.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070579/cee2386c3b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f81a4787-3b8a-4010-91be-a37402abf06e/bekobojagun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/98aea414-a4de-4207-a51e-93a8fde7e4d7/badibozukinifusujikel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d48dae39-385d-4519-b6b1-b05f85e7410f/jepukak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/65be0921-3862-417b-9bfb-9f6727dbff6d/xikugorusopiwuvoralonu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_005_off0000964c.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x964C 22688 bytes
SHA-256: 4f97ffb7c574d8dcc6464f5758b46f221aed8c8d2a82119887de608e55857569
font_00_sfnt_off00006267.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6267 5108 bytes
SHA-256: cd68a3c901edefea20db9a7680b39a1382168a6e5fccde37b8258ec8603ef51d
font_01_sfnt_off000073eb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73EB 9996 bytes
SHA-256: 03e68c822d056e54947cd573d0bd3a05915186756b6be7e2865091fb61f7df9c

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