Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63ae8e62c1019bc2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.5 KB
MD5: 6661da776eff54687a6eea47e7240cbc SHA-1: bc353e26afa94683fa737bc0c3ebd8a58725ada0 SHA-256: 63ae8e62c1019bc28b14891c9b6263ef16620689584ccbbe840586933f070d99
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE objects and a split hex Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000de.bin
abe41b14230f94f5caaf028a9e5cbe4f16fe5b5963e6685186177ef8da81c3fd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDE 2021 bytes