Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63ae63a37ec256d4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: 2c2b953e31dc61ad34588e4f8e12f797 SHA-1: 7886453139c796d489c13ad36df22f79c93dda8b SHA-256: 63ae63a37ec256d4836d4e29436f43ba0475db5c223ef216dd424f115503ee79
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation for client execution. The document's likely purpose is to deliver a malicious payload upon opening.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin
6faf3976ef30af32e5000c6534754374b0c3183ae611e0b95db7a8fb8ead2734
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 1586 bytes