Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63a8642a81d598ca…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.5 KB Created: 2020-11-24 13:36:56 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d2ed9bade25db9e56d9309ad28f3dfed SHA-1: 16ec55870be1ff09f2a5268c07934332da0c3964 SHA-256: 63a8642a81d598ca0baca94fb529baad413f3aa1b00bf71bf7db5432bb1942d5
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous external links, many of which are hosted on Weebly and S3 domains, suggesting a link farm or distribution network. The presence of a 'download button' lure and the 'password-protected archive' heuristic indicate a phishing or social engineering attempt to trick the user into downloading a payload. ClamAV detection and ML classification further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/aws?utm_term=filezilla++folder+as+zip
    • https://vobakedipevurot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661611/teledadaja_runitanidup.pdf
    • https://vigoxanumevu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134466257/31efd7c891c3f8.pdf
    • https://fuzujaloxoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134684853/senirifod.pdf
    • https://vulajavup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134683256/reselozudadewo.pdf
    • https://labajilawuja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406369/9b6cd.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420764/normal_5f9d288d3be38.pdf
    • https://wokozizexufam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234926/3884895.pdf
    • https://ritibamubube.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437410/mivavipolakun_birosexoni_lokix.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fasanag/gtc_2018_dates.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sepawi/denewumivobalibobesaxufik.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wilugugo/29477681602.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/moduxanakuri/67081842719.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dorobukasawituw/army_da-31_leave.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cdff.bin
97778327dfb794b93ec5c6d54d7accf9669443b142ff1addf9ab963cd7dfc991		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCDFF 5040 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000df44.bin
82bb2d52bc9c672205761145b7a30ce0772ac2d592bd037eb3355536ba5fce97		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF44 13256 bytes

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