Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6387c9a9395dfa8d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

36.3 KB
MD5: 76ce432dc9aa416203007945fbe31962 SHA-1: 68d2f57036dc82a9c3e0d1320d39c894e0940529 SHA-256: 6387c9a9395dfa8da7252ba9bfa3d509a3c39bd2e3e3f2354c30be4d29ad5b29
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882, indicating the exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This vulnerability is used to embed and activate an OLE object, which is designed to execute arbitrary code on the victim's system. The specific class identified, 'EquatioN.3', is directly associated with this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000004eb.bin
11e175a38a4448c97a0b62321f9b3a98d83c6b213857cf02495272360e50e89f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4EB 1665 bytes