Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 636df4f49e08abe5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.8 KB Created: 2020-11-22 01:12:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 610ec57205a0faf367d5599c4a877640 SHA-1: b71c4a7e149ae6c7b018f3cad3e3633911426541 SHA-256: 636df4f49e08abe5215f2ac231d70bc1b8b7af1a3b1ff1999cae56df61c1a1d0
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or SEO manipulation attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of a malicious document designed to redirect users.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffnew.ru/123?utm_term=salt+and+sanctuary+grey+pearl+farm PDF link annotation
    • https://fofaxofik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134521529/6530318.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xexezakofiwojuv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134372147/podunomog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4459631/normal_5fa616db0063e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sajesugepila.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134467456/4426427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jufozovujibozom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134360308/a37c5eb6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nemulokisen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134492012/jukafufebig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://totapige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483287/lutol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuwuvaxurig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134649086/318619.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zisatusomet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134872515/damegeraririg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9b1a5357-e487-452d-ab74-d16b87def89e/the_great_bridge_david_mccullough_summary.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nafibanefexex/xumamuwuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0b808b27-ba7c-4006-aeb8-d1a2a2ad218b/50729729253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/83f3843a-9e68-4de3-b72a-5d17a39455ce/weposa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c6cf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC6CF 5680 bytes
SHA-256: 6eb8a3a4dbfdad0bbe03dabb590e0b3827876f44ae7fec34cde185df946127fa
font_01_sfnt_off0000da20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDA20 14228 bytes
SHA-256: 044ea8ac055ae2cf8d0c77148f7c6e890446aec5c631343a4cc305c92a99e9b9

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