Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63342e8a5d684f5b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.1 KB Created: 2020-10-29 18:43:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 5a8a98111abaa3af8615578b8703f568 SHA-1: 33bd0b6441f7e926ccf4e3ad538f7b8438ff45be SHA-256: 63342e8a5d684f5be39882cbc06623fe5462b795cd68a15653a4f55ead3eb042
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on disposable domains and appear to be part of a link farm. One critical heuristic indicates that a link within the PDF redirects to known malicious infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that matches the malicious redirector. This suggests the document is designed to lead users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=tumi+black+friday+promo+code In PDF document text
    • https://nafeziwubiwodi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379183/8ae1eab65f96e0c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zifuxiwow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997311/9fb5aed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://joleziravakejar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460301/jujirumanofunutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonuveviriniw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738603/7dc0ea71b02.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/e5bcd2697.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://weniwekozeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134012595/zajomikume.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://firedisivimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969818/9307010.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nipaxibovaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379211/tadesix_bipobusav_lototozilud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/felasorarabipis/kixajezuxenuragoneg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5c51cb84-7735-4033-a150-4187fff9b4b4/kedosaxazizezinusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/76ce1e39-7678-4001-b30d-d6799f57633e/zologoxexevubataz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ed0d953-c72e-4e28-afae-e47f57d7e078/61119517829.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fusidejebi/raruxuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/058668be-56bc-41e2-897f-48a67ab7b98d/descargar_el_fuego_de_la_venganza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000646f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x646F 5376 bytes
SHA-256: 1c5d5c9fefbfdba8fa7a9f8e1b332fa09de06d44665bafb668d6f94945bb91ef
font_01_sfnt_off000076ae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76AE 10868 bytes
SHA-256: f7729654d8b11c620e77a01a7d834ded90b8c862a08ad7f93d59ce94aec41ad8

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.