Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63298f0b9322773c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

119.2 KB Created: 2021-06-26 08:57:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-25
MD5: 8865197e357d4168a90009f13288e798 SHA-1: 5bfa17480b462abfff45cc97f41459aaf58e42d1 SHA-256: 63298f0b9322773cbd45387bb3161cd1705399f939feed34da238c9770f39aea
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing and potential trojan threat. It employs a payment redirection lure, impersonating the brand UPS to trick users into clicking a link for updated bank transfer details. The embedded URLs, such as 'https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=wesley+chapel+tag+office', are likely part of this phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9944

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=wesley+chapel+tag+office.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=wesley+chapel+tag+office PDF link annotation
    • https://airflow-skateboards.com/upload/file/37115227804.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://worldcar.jp/userfiles/files/84607486390.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cullinanconstruction.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/i17mess907hjsbu8g67b8gclj1/soseramobijusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jamiatulbanat.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609a22995873f---12751909171.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.rebranded.tv/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089b386be316---45467875599.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smartcookieacademy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a44dd254d01---60486831071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://laihouston.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/42baa553c5642d2f7d3355ae1076202c/78671765443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.grandeprairie.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c438f3f2654---dipasuguzipexunapafexoki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://delawaretravelmedicine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083b648d5e14---1951177270.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pensiuneavalentina.ro/app/webroot/file/xozadedakorixolalifi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://j-line.ca/fck_upload/file/11642246952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://3dreamstudios.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d057f36267554aa35f0e1dcdd3a38578/3981639836.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.nuricomuvakfi.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/30vva3akp9bsghm17r948r04p3/71769713567.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stark-tools.ru/images/uploaded/wamogopimu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://markzone.az/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/67n66p50b24gq2717ftqo0rgrf/vawat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bangprice.combangprice.com/beta/cms_image/file/lejofimevulajetad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dungcuruamui.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hcg9n4986harfb3nbnkbd74neb/sozorukojazedapoli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alexanderkanevskyartgallery.com/clientMedia/file/xepudejisejiperogozezov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fieldofgreen.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ae07355e024fe2514a124c7b630e0989/xomekag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://farmaciafici.com/userfiles/files/82409809822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--o79av69abka850ab6c.com/upload/file/202106121829567006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://am-assets.com/aom/magnolia/userfiles/file/99186832682.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hungarianassociation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609848439e55c---nubodajowimebazuduz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000170df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x170DF 10664 bytes
SHA-256: 80035a62dc41e3049b3c18d146f3270e0caf60a0a19425df21c5702936b5e2e8
font_01_sfnt_off00018988.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18988 17544 bytes
SHA-256: b918094b1fd2f118d16802eec497512b0b937a8010f80297055a6ff00dcd6570
font_02_sfnt_off0001b7c5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B7C5 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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