Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6316ba2656af7efb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

22.4 KB
MD5: 8d123b34099b4b9bed19882bebf0b255 SHA-1: d1fdd14e9114471710bc6c06afa64d08181aa433 SHA-256: 6316ba2656af7efb6fa93a9ea2787bc05886c86f3ace73ddad605d6a80bb6c56
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability via \objupdate. This indicates a likely exploitation attempt to gain code execution on the victim's machine. The embedded OLE object data is a strong indicator of a malicious payload delivery mechanism, though its exact nature requires further dynamic analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001c4c.bin
542862dc75fbe79fa6df6625d1d9865909a4e24e8a91e169b9891f545530d71d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C4C 2024 bytes