Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63023042d309eb9d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

32.1 KB First seen: 2023-06-10
MD5: 40ae9f6726671bbe54184d13f035ce4f SHA-1: fe35cd465dffc2f18f058ab2a07e2722245c3c8a SHA-256: 63023042d309eb9d5d4c3e13562f6646ad2975905880c41f52570b6bff065340
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate heuristic indicates that the object is configured to activate automatically upon opening, and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic confirms the presence of a prompt to enable editing, which is a common social engineering tactic. This suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely related to the Equation Editor, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004a4e.bin
b37d599a4cd6f32c3f853a1b6eb7764f55b2a24026e21e6178e44b77a7cb525b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4A4E 1757 bytes