Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 62eb0fec7cbd5f56…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

170.4 KB Created: 2021-01-05 12:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 9a4297162e708b846ca450b33bcf686c SHA-1: 0dde6d30bb12f90d26c9ed57d186e69711e1a2b3 SHA-256: 62eb0fec7cbd5f5678dbf2c5760339f886634b8eb21cb6280e81ed8ba852eecf
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject to interact with the file system. The macro attempts to write arbitrary strings to files named 'oYmKn.fjbxt' and 'wQjECuG.KvyWqY' in specific directories. This behavior is characteristic of Emotet, which often uses macros to download and execute further stages of its payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5fd199a84582bf2c4248191e49df05fe3a9d17ab4a6f639ead9a581ea6be129f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10799 bytes

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