Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 62cf273595d15f17…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

153.5 KB Created: 2020-09-15 04:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: ffad3001dd0ca42afc9417e202532d08 SHA-1: 54a9c7de3af91cc394a1818ef39b0870ddb817b8 SHA-256: 62cf273595d15f172a4e5465d9ab16c22bb5f52d2626a84c3811e1a111f77fa3
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that triggers an obfuscated PowerShell stager. This stager is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, as indicated by the critical heuristic 'OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL'. The presence of VBA macros and the specific macro name 'Document_open' strongly suggest a malicious document intended for initial compromise via spearphishing.

Heuristics 7

  • Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL
    OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Ewlu-9762397-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Ewlu-9762397-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
262eaa2cfabe15c408f9ed0f71f3e80b6e1636570aa2563811ecb34f68c15392
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 22860 bytes