Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 62cddd05a895b194…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.30 MB Created: 2025-09-16 18:10:00 First seen: 2026-01-26
MD5: c885ce2f789972455f181d62b824fd22 SHA-1: 657cdca9f7a6ff83ea49d30dcdbed0ec36703ec2 SHA-256: 62cddd05a895b1948e6a65e4002e0b2d09954dda2e75889d95f4f8e09015f5b6
422 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation). The presence of large hex-encoded data blocks and PE headers within OLE objects strongly suggests the embedding of a malicious executable. The document body content appears to be a generic resume template, likely a lure to encourage opening the malicious RTF.

Heuristics 11

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1694KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.thawte.com0
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
    • http://cs-g2-crl.thawte.com/ThawteCSG2.crl0
    • http://crl.thawte.com/ThawtePCA.crl0
    • https://www.globalsign.com/repository/0
    • http://ocsp.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g40C
    • http://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/gstsacasha384g4.crt0
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g4.crl0
    • http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/rootr606
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r6.crl0G

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af73f.bin
af0321092aafea36e9480e838519313915c380b81c379ab60d3145e909d0a339		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF73F 743082 bytes
objdata_01_off00225bef.bin
d841fb09458f28707fa3b061de849cdb7c0817ab5e9759696e1890dc6eea4516		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x225BEF 584266 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
2352c9fffd0fd8eba341b4fd80ae0a94a85929bec042e2061b1f17cd52df50f2		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116884 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.