Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 62a8d2b479c2ca5e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

8.1 KB
MD5: c799918bea63450cb17e724edb8f1f71 SHA-1: 919856ea903cb6e52c0749b2ec7e5b9cd50bb61c SHA-256: 62a8d2b479c2ca5ebae2cb2e5ca4a06dd209cd02e19c65e9a5fa21a08bcbd2c9
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF sample contains obfuscated JavaScript, indicated by PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The presence of PDF_EVAL and PDF_FROMCHARCODE, grouped under PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER, strongly suggests an exploit targeting JavaScript execution within the PDF viewer. The ML classifier also flagged the sample as malicious. While no specific URLs or second-stage scripts were directly extracted, the exploit cluster points to a likely download-and-execute attack pattern, commonly associated with spearphishing attachments.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.6569

Heuristics 6

  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_004_off0000049f.bin
4447bc3bf2370788a868beaf4e818cbde6061d04686c8a8695d700584551fe2b
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x49F 4794 bytes
objstm_0013_00.bin
3ec841b01a1bb1aa700b49a4f383b3c25444c501028558ea845e84b840f95f4d
pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 13 0 obj (inflated) 171 bytes