Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 627cb7160a9656b9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

136.1 KB Created: 2022-07-02 05:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-07-04
MD5: d0fb72c9009b0060287e21a7b190509d SHA-1: 3bd6e088e98e1eeaeb207c502460cf44cabafea2 SHA-256: 627cb7160a9656b9f2919d3bd596147c6f042805f044adb3dde6f3b5838907ae
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload. The heuristic 'OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE' specifically indicates that the package drops a '.jar' file, which is a common format for executable Java code. This suggests the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
ce877439a2dc5f4ab9f6b5675194235d5e76ca5e6a8a27c11362f2b205a06214		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 111104 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.94, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
c9e62a1dbe8680eb729e241de3ab995e477d1d0d2f8a660027200347cdae0a91		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 107284 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
4e4fb1d00440c91fabd43471755980fe5e7ebaf4bce809b5c0745303aba7a260		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5464 bytes

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