Malware Insights
The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoClose function that utilizes the Shell() command. This macro attempts to construct a path and execute a file, likely a second-stage payload. The obfuscated string concatenation within the script suggests an attempt to hide the malicious URL and filename, which are reconstructed as 'g:\am\aotDrcrP', '.lld', and 'cyrQw5Gl/R5t8/ DZ97Sod30~~qu1i ~6HK/V2-Fr7L~keM9wfeU/dMmdptXwhw.7zGQRQmcjfOUchu Y__btE11.cDEj/G6g .:/npH2pQtgD25t/Cxkcx8li'. The PEB access heuristic further indicates suspicious behavior.
Heuristics 7
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.bf93e2e062840f3b-OOXML-9981529-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.bf93e2e062840f3b-OOXML-9981529-0
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PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESSPEB access via FS segment (x86)
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VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMEDThe VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
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Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSEAuto_Close macro
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VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/EbeVFuwsNY.bin)
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basf756df55a30322e270e1f0ce93a46d87275afcacab363857ea6877f1118e94a1 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 1097 bytes |
vbaProject_00.bin09b1e1db6e69405f9c05a9eedff8ad00311c23ef7a78c70ddff8f1bcaddd6804 |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/EbeVFuwsNY.bin | 5632 bytes |
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