Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 626c52f344777cbd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

1.66 MB Created: 2022-09-01 10:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-09-01
MD5: d3596adf2297f27f212f70fe1649c4ca SHA-1: beae009b96b352d4e5695675c3f1edffe2fd46eb SHA-256: 626c52f344777cbdb7a865aecca8d029c582377aa57216d381d361a5b400e9aa
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoClose function that utilizes the Shell() command. This macro attempts to construct a path and execute a file, likely a second-stage payload. The obfuscated string concatenation within the script suggests an attempt to hide the malicious URL and filename, which are reconstructed as 'g:\am\aotDrcrP', '.lld', and 'cyrQw5Gl/R5t8/ DZ97Sod30~~qu1i ~6HK/V2-Fr7L~keM9wfeU/dMmdptXwhw.7zGQRQmcjfOUchu Y__btE11.cDEj/G6g .:/npH2pQtgD25t/Cxkcx8li'. The PEB access heuristic further indicates suspicious behavior.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.bf93e2e062840f3b-OOXML-9981529-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.bf93e2e062840f3b-OOXML-9981529-0
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/EbeVFuwsNY.bin)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f756df55a30322e270e1f0ce93a46d87275afcacab363857ea6877f1118e94a1
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1097 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
09b1e1db6e69405f9c05a9eedff8ad00311c23ef7a78c70ddff8f1bcaddd6804
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/EbeVFuwsNY.bin 5632 bytes