Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6253af0a87332d27…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Created: 2021-09-19 01:58:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 77c40a0703528ee54a02e082281db0bf SHA-1: 10b2d5b95ee5733cfc029f04cc89ee58505c6829 SHA-256: 6253af0a87332d27ef4487365019c3e2a04871fdf011a0561f7af0536342ea1c
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external links, some pointing to compromised CMS uploads, suggesting an attempt to deliver a payload or phish for information. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports a malicious download lure. ClamAV detection confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://synerhu.ru/uplcv?utm_term=download+towelroot+apk+latest+version PDF link annotation
    • http://fujavietnam.com/images/Download/13531113372.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://crimesla.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/xogebilopevunepesapidumov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://filippodelvita.com/demo/userfiles/file/mejufiguvefekuxan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--90ah6akb9e.xn--p1ai/f/file/degakuxezibutipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vroa.pl/chplusfiles/file/gozerapibuvediruvapivix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bkm-market.net/userfiles/file/56037137146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://primer-spb.ru/files/files/61953273517.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://orchid-daikanyama.com/userfiles/file/73031570775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nanobubblevietnam.com/uploads/userfiles/file/kenuluzakakivirif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ageddfjtjgrade.pretty-match.com/upload/files/xunawadokusisidu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goozzl.com/userfiles/files/4007486194.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ezhealthcheck.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bf7ips3t690s1tba62ncr0n25c/64175036347.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://modelseafarm.com/kweb/ckfinder/userfiles/files/newubopodepil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuacongtudongbinhduong.com/upload/files/xurax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://boathousebrokerage.com/userfiles/file/lojavadivuvega.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://technoauto.jp/js/upload/files/56785151937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://manage3.realtourvision.com/rtv/ckfinder/userfiles/images/files/77247118168.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ky-auto.com/uploadfile/files/55600068958.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://spazmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140450f93721---woranawawitade.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://n95america.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/36d0d81e8c689bd668b7b92039ba88a7/jinululexafutoxamizobovor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jongauger.com/userfiles/file/43828044934.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://egyptlance.com/userfiles/file/88911878790.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e555.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE555 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fd67.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD67 19348 bytes
SHA-256: 4db7b72be935d6e555c6e35971fdaf2a7f699194157f1195ab84b0d12020b7fc
font_02_sfnt_off00012f91.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12F91 10628 bytes
SHA-256: 95e72764a33935fe1980fa390878bf69ee59826e82c3365caf887cfca04bae0c

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