Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 625177c57e151467…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

162.7 KB Created: 2021-01-04 16:15:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: d3a9861978cca092300535e9d7289658 SHA-1: 5eb9f791a413b61eb2f994f4341fa89ca6a79f2f SHA-256: 625177c57e1514671688d2c14ae2e4b28378e7bdcfe0405801d5cb84796e5d3a
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro that executes automatically when the document is opened. This macro uses obfuscated API calls, specifically reassembling the string 'Scripting.FileSystemObject' to create and write to files on the system. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0' strongly suggests the Emotet family, which is known for its downloader capabilities.

Heuristics 7

  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b7c08445609ad3b9c2a0766b1423df26453c524cbf6c8eca0da53a1732c00612		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7252 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.