MALICIOUS
242
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The RTF file contains heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759 through embedded OLE objects, specifically referencing the Equation Editor (Equation.3). This suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.
Heuristics 7
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Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITORRTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
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CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
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Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATEDRTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off001c1102.bin449e71f8799359e236f0f3955e4e2a47119303d42b00a7debcf15495ff26d665 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C1102 | 1478 bytes |
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