Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 622ba00d105e39cd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

292.4 KB Created: 2022-09-11 20:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-09-13
MD5: ce23ea064ca1419a2cf8ff52fe0ae729 SHA-1: d3abd2581129a64a8d6c11f37141d2a1bb6fbf80 SHA-256: 622ba00d105e39cd4fb63978c0dccebca17b0a05708a07e1157cd3cd1bd1caca
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE package is designed to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests a malicious intent to deliver a secondary stage payload upon opening or interaction with the document.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
a48e3163d8918e60f0bcbe7852ef28c1fdefaa75b6bab186ffc120339011b244		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 190464 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
eade269070d70b232f17545e222cff253600ed03468990bda286d3601e48e31d		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 186352 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
c9567a4792205a148bafd1a543043669aab7ed4d59abb43ab726fada6fa3e40f		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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