Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6218304ca2d642f9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

56.2 KB Created: 2021-08-30 16:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 11544bd7ed6f7d4c70c52da4fd0b3529 SHA-1: fd7f85800d4383bfa49af274a40f288c8f548859 SHA-256: 6218304ca2d642f997199218234694b91699ea9aa4ad7c24d61ad2a2f5fd7cb3
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as a Microsoft Equation Editor object. High-severity heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and exploits CVE-2018-0798, a known vulnerability allowing for arbitrary code execution. The embedded object itself is the primary indicator of compromise.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
aedaa78a38d7f834aa34339206607d7ab0ce1cee01407fe75760b0b27eaea3ff
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4096 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
e9e1824fb5876423981edde57982e1384ecc70305622f767b7544bd933bbd958
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: OLe10natIVe 1914 bytes