Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61e3145237aa8919…

MALICIOUS

PDF

976.7 KB Created: 2010-01-06 11:43:37 +08:00
MD5: e8faeb121089614e96017ea232778e5d SHA-1: f83b08e5d372fb406da0bac740d3a121cba171c1 SHA-256: 61e3145237aa8919b4d292c1736936116e5db8c9e5c61e3a00b75261615c8aba
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits CVE-2009-4324 (media.newPlayer vulnerability). The script attempts to trigger this exploit by allocating a large amount of memory and then calling this.media.newPlayer(null). This action is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Encrypted PDF carries /JS — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JS). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0044_000.js
5fb8da2aa23152c21fa5438090c3d3de2525d5c0e5fd80e4be4ecd16c7c63e7c		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 44 at offset 0xF26CA 251 bytes
javascript_obj0046_001.js
dc3624b295ecd8c8896f8dceeb8d2a38dc3d760fedf2ad59d96e39be86822dbf		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 46 at offset 0xF2834 121 bytes
javascript_obj0047_002.js
ad7c07e3fd606d6ee81277e54c5723a98c59feb37d48d20b05f1091745c84695		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 47 at offset 0xF28E0 747 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
combined_document_js_000.js
44cbca39843ce5c4298d452cb541f3137305c77bd1ca5c122355312d4e0a4368		 deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0xF26CA 1121 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
objstm_0049_00.bin
529e024da18616019fe0384d4bf1234166f593848439a000d021e6c2dba0760b		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 49 0 obj (inflated) 48 bytes

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