Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61e229f66cc85e3a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

32.3 KB Created: 2020-10-31 06:01:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 85981584fe214ccbb042fd5e52c5d22c SHA-1: 92083babc7f670eee862a5d7cb361a0f12a1590b SHA-256: 61e229f66cc85e3ab310f80716116407206a02c2aaa22d5515115b37b7c5ec6b
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links pointing to external PDF documents, a technique often used for SEO manipulation or to distribute malicious content. One of the primary links directs to a known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/wb?keyword=karl%20marx%20comunismo%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380682/normal_5f91d424cbf53.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379844/normal_5f8ebbcfda5c5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sakukavazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379729/b69ee7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4411503/normal_5f93e839e47d7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369330/normal_5f88a2f7ece3a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jipidonano.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340070/xukiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruxodinari.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134377607/tesiriwod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sulajaxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134362611/8383580.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://porimejonawi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134368737/9741746.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fujidefabez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134512048/rutolatebum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f9c2630e-b5fb-40cf-bbc7-01f6e5574db4/wijugirelekamazofefileral.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/946f0dd9-1302-4fee-a995-2e006d167919/39797637723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fdc64263-497a-4344-a7f7-2696e2b37aba/vajol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/61499aea-48df-47e2-bb1d-03062648aa76/pufiliwiwixulopakixomoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7c371076-d98d-4462-a30f-3d0e62eb50d2/voxalujopesije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000040a5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x40A5 5340 bytes
SHA-256: 9a694e61ba726b7e37f76d13001e5cdaedfc4ec40fe8f01b77889274f6065976
font_01_sfnt_off000052bd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x52BD 9600 bytes
SHA-256: b73f700ec11cbe664c725ede288c09f4aad1950191ef72a221cbe6727e7a166d