Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61c0d17c4830c80b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

7.5 KB
MD5: a301c70e0cd72dcbf033e15e87350be6 SHA-1: 6521e0801d842c435dd0ed431b504d6441e1c611 SHA-256: 61c0d17c4830c80ba722a6b48788b6fb189e2a65be2ad755bf05e21224c0ee2d
350 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML file contains VBA macros, including Auto_open and Auto_close, which are designed to execute automatically. The Auto_open macro uses URLDownloadToFile to download two files: 'msi.ps1' from http://updatewin32.xyz/3.txt and 'Google.vbs' from http://edc.com.ly/index/wp.txt, saving them to the public user directory. The Auto_close macro then executes 'Google.vbs' using cmd.exe, indicating a multi-stage infection process.

Heuristics 10

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/vKJHGKJhgkjgKHJG.bin)
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://updatewin32.xyz/3.txt
    • http://edc.com.ly/index/wp.txt
    • http://updatewin32.xyz/3.txt�
    • http://edc.com.ly/index/wp.txt�

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
e3459266af0e927b12feb451dc1ee4ff2fbabac2ff7254732e87d655b4c46b74		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 637 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
0a8f7285718c1228c62b0ce57bc841dd24897810541bc0311aa5af813e530241		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vKJHGKJhgkjgKHJG.bin 16896 bytes

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