Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61b2838f7cfc6292…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.1 KB
MD5: 5fc5e2e341de87972d0809de6fb59c0e SHA-1: e5b97526dd7271a9ead6c514ffa2a82b9f21e748 SHA-256: 61b2838f7cfc62929c830c74eda92b0c87d56844473d6fa282c0b19bb4aa8367
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability to execute arbitrary code upon opening, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin
41d29a17720e5d43a3fab95e693c5dff896129fd38bb3a949969ac07204e32a1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1363 bytes