Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61a703163e793c9d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-10-27 01:20:13 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: e41cc137d671eba1ad6bf7cf3f8f5ee4 SHA-1: 0e0ad29925ed24a340ee8f3800c1cc3d7891cf01 SHA-256: 61a703163e793c9da1d14343806ca1ba89d0aad60e55c122f0dbfcc28779af04
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/pify?keyword=teemo+the+hutt In PDF document text
    • https://jabiratunibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683422/fetanutani.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://besiwalufeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696214/ac115b69bda4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nonudefetug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314303/9318819.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gosedizomomusuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134313056/7794264.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zegokovoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134323662/4280596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://keniwuki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483234/5d6f2da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavoxoxuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379246/goved_sajed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mefemanodi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454269/detobo_sanulinazenobig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wozofawado.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874325/4492772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lakupemeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235705/e901248f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zadumeredevasax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453870/9038680.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://korodaziso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740443/xuketized-juvakonuxuzaduz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006533.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006533.bin)
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6c18825d-41d8-4232-a982-59b14edc9bbd/64397186739.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aa1ad83b-17d3-4688-ba00-e61ca9114847/towekokabepadufojox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5a49b2f1-2aea-4db6-b8aa-d7814f8c63eb/56951102913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/62524edb-07e8-4f9a-bbf1-683c7b06bbee/84069387405.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ba750328-a857-4e55-805e-93b8b51eb354/afyon_yaptr_arksn_indir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4523/1515/files/sql_server_2012_internals_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0486/4324/4200/files/wadixanujudelimerezi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/firigugixujotov/tarepis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fejenijovekozu/midas_touch_trump_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006533.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006533.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6533 4360 bytes
SHA-256: f2decbd5893b9ca0dc470e39a2a86aef4d242b643729bed420c5004829406405
font_01_sfnt_off000073e7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73E7 10148 bytes
SHA-256: 60d699c2a08d4974ef596869582922e9da194b38174bc06e2c20a0e01026b772

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