Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6190f570255470aa…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.77 MB First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: 9c073ca103c2483bf2318eceb61ee7cb SHA-1: 91d5df7d78bd195887ae6917cf5da6ff66fbec61 SHA-256: 6190f570255470aa4ae6982ba4daaf6220d3896dd221aad18a14832dc68b534e
482 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-8570, including the use of Composite Moniker and OLE object data. The embedded OLE object contains a PE header in hex data, suggesting it is a payload. The heuristic firings and the presence of an embedded URL point towards the execution of a second-stage payload from the malicious URL.

Heuristics 11

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Fareit-6683191-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Dropper.Fareit-6683191-0
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1828KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 7 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://test1.ru/newbuild/t.php?act=hit In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000002c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C 884 bytes
SHA-256: 08cb831cfd094f7193857584f98ebb419e336c73f0191f78a94fb322b6fcad85
objdata_01_off00018d83.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18D83 32665 bytes
SHA-256: 3ecf1dfd32f5951f336f53c593c7818acd7b0669199736e1d96753e6f905e31e
objdata_02_off00028ce8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x28CE8 831162 bytes
SHA-256: 2e33569005801327bfbd6587e686a0d3c19dd9f80807550624c38b4da0cc7caf
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Fareit-6683191-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: LoadLibraryExA, VirtualAlloc, GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualProtect
objdata_03_off001bea9a.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BEA9A 355 bytes
SHA-256: 3195b1bb51f48678bbe4dca3a7cd77a2ecfaf683d76f3b6382c1ffd5124a7220
objdata_04_off001bed94.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BED94 2336 bytes
SHA-256: 1e718c98482888205ce4801225fa04eb564a3f0c52e4fd67224788723ca94f24
objdata_05_off001c003b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C003B 2633 bytes
SHA-256: 1feb5f150bb35566d1a01fc59a357dc0ea34bc7498e0ec99bd939f6f848044b0
objdata_06_off001c1545.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C1545 4679 bytes
SHA-256: 0e2ce9d01b0df41beca1d9d003ff4bfe3998a96192a53992dd35145a081e0a27

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