Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 618cfb0b74aa99ab…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

14.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-12
MD5: 84ceadbe4deb4f7801732e22c964475e SHA-1: 7ce8a2cfe362029b6464af515303eb0977780777 SHA-256: 618cfb0b74aa99aba1ff6ba05b76dda3f577edb2a55cd90e572c1ce0344c95eb
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADER' indicates that the VBA macros are designed to execute shellcode loaded from document properties. The 'Document_Open' macro is triggered upon opening the document, and it reads configuration data from document properties using a reversed string function. This shellcode is likely used to download and execute a secondary payload from a remote source, as suggested by the obfuscated script attempting to read values from custom document properties.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADER
    VBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA reads reversed config from document properties high OLE_VBA_REVERSED_DOCPROP_CONFIG
    VBA applies StrReverse to values read from the document's custom/built-in properties. Storing reversed configuration (URLs, CLSIDs, env-var names, payload names) in document properties keeps indicators out of the macro source — an obfuscation technique used by the SVCReady loader.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1cb1749d957690b3c4ef7ef6d6d94aceea8919f14cfbde4c21dfd0bbd6a7d7b9
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 19434 bytes