Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61724c73d2da9a51…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

184.0 KB Created: 2021-03-24 18:23:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: c0c4b9a3d5297d7f74a7355f0fef91f2 SHA-1: 8fa362ce25e9255e3a4653adbcd052a559729228 SHA-256: 61724c73d2da9a5119ec54cbc700c28a26e9c1c23ad5f20b5f65649840c970ef
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The document was identified as malicious due to the presence of an embedded OLE object which is flagged as a risky package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. This indicates the document is likely a malicious attachment designed to execute a secondary payload upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
cc0830399a652337fc0be427405b14ee30ac88df0a399b28f179448066faaebd		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 173568 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
134da6038cb14172bb30459edf9f0b263298f1edd69a175fedf8eb56aae718c7		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 169879 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
7caa290b9482f3bc561d812282af779cadac226de61f0e7f2ace1694a4def319		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes

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