Office (OOXML) malware analysis — malicious · 61603b877dcda4f6

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

17.3 KB Created: 2021-07-26 22:59:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000

MD5: 964b55ea6714c823d9aa29bd29d3449e SHA-1: dcf5c45483af7ecad9f8a0d842edd34705948d16 SHA-256: 61603b877dcda4f6abc7b9a4930a08f2102ec8d11fc0befdb3a8f2ec4d88bc44

162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an `autoopen` subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon document opening. The macro uses `curl` to download an executable from `http://192.168.1.9/wget.exe` and saves it as `C:\temp\test.exe`, then executes it. This indicates an attempt to download and run a second-stage payload, likely for further system compromise.

Heuristics 5

Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Shell() call in VBA
AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://192.168.1.9/wget.exe
- http://192.168.1.9
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `3ca6abb8bfe4f3399bb1cbf0f262f9463cafd7a40f4d4b84bc19b8cf037ef415`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	452 bytes
`vbaProject_00.bin` `32b4c3aa0698579316bcffb873958f64486179822c5ef6d348fb8b9e321e1d8b`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	13824 bytes

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