Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 615cc7448da7e0be…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

426.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-06-14
MD5: 0fb471b837dc537fdfe1e7b37997404b SHA-1: c3b26000066ef07b9b705838c339aa0b3d80bb82 SHA-256: 615cc7448da7e0be6ebb77fe630d28a94a195bb31afaa3952bd1f457128e4ded
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing indicates the exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to download a remote document from http://109.248.144.244/re/rererererererererererererererere%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23rerererererererer.doc. This suggests the file acts as a loader for a secondary malicious payload. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious static findings, further supporting a malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://109.248.144.244/re/rererererererererererererererere%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23rerererererererer.doc
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
polyglot_child_pdf_off00008200.pdf
8834fc825793852d2f8bbc08b51a9a0a60c5e69c48a27e166df489e09d332708		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x8200 402944 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001da00.pdf
96d50843f240da1bfdbab30df7a91d53c192cc674be91ede2080be4d480b34f0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1DA00 314880 bytes

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