Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 613e1419cf406c11…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.2 KB Created: 2020-09-04 15:52:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: be99285b4c89863789fe6c688e2fded5 SHA-1: 72cb54f894dbfdd9539c2223be76d4f79c3929e1 SHA-256: 613e1419cf406c111c5d98a547ce8dd0ba7c841786cfd4f0b4208b32249220dc
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

This PDF file contains a lure to trick users into executing commands via their clipboard, as indicated by the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic. It also embeds a link to a redirector infrastructure, 'https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=adobe+illustrator+cs6+logo+design+tutorial+pdf', which is flagged as malicious. The combination suggests an attempt to deliver a second-stage payload through social engineering.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=adobe+illustrator+cs6+logo+design+tutorial+pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0464/2753/7560/files/25452787393.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7249/5526/files/clasificacion_de_benzodiacepinas_segun_su_vida_media.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7837/6853/files/sql_server_2012_commands_cheat_sheet.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7801/6421/files/auditoria_administrativa_benjamin_franklin_3ra_edicion.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2199/1079/files/chrisye_sabda_alam.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_d76afc95570843bbb83e292015836584.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9ea91e_3765dfd859c147cdbadc50850df0661d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0fdb6d_39eeb371d8ad472daa6701413814ee15.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/69b86f_f22e964dd98c494eb452e926ab9989e8.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0461/3809/7817/files/dekuduximifepadono.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1130/8696/files/konodilav.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1347/0365/files/time_off_work_request_form_template.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e78b77_0439880a053848c29c9d84381c4ed879.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/defcb2_7405272b89194d299753741c8107c76c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d48fe3_b6d16998d2d941ed9e6cdb60bf29d8c4.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006dc0.bin
d5ed352bdb4058fca64f09438ee9fcceb10d099d909e8afa6d7a143e5d795895		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6DC0 5604 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000080da.bin
f488c1cb9f8422f3e63a842aa4075d922cd9e22fdc47e0a1818334272533236c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80DA 10244 bytes

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