Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 613068422c214b94…

MALICIOUS

RTF

7.4 KB First seen: 2024-07-29
MD5: 3233db78e37302b47436b550a21cdaf9 SHA-1: 3f26b7480d1db1234b998c65fae542c6fee0ef21 SHA-256: 613068422c214b944c7b2e3fb60412ed99d35c9e18d53d45b16965c5a36f734a
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code when the embedded object is activated, which is forced by the \objupdate directive. The decoded object data suggests an attempt to exploit this mechanism for code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000d0d.bin
64a6a264b468e358ec7ba58a2dd5afdb023e32003e319c228cf144c86ed22da9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD0D 1813 bytes
objdata_01_off00000d4c.bin
4246920f0544eeba7d3b1417801a7aab2cf10000ae35667eafef7faccccc61d9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD4C 38 bytes