Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 610eafec159e7e6e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

94.5 KB Created: 2021-06-25 14:30:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-25
MD5: 162cee30be49e9d3d1fccd85a5bd3653 SHA-1: af9a292d70ebf35fad13afa8e300f5e7b7deda8e SHA-256: 610eafec159e7e6ec2018e9905e8ba886b7dffe288e15f4055919442d4c6f17a
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF document employs social engineering tactics, specifically a browser extension or update installation lure, to trick users into executing malicious content. The document contains numerous links to external sites, many hosted on compromised WordPress installations, suggesting an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://garglob.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+you+cash+out+in+cash+app PDF link annotation
    • http://compie.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608108cc1994f---35951390248.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baodinhsolar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/81jtver6esjqfuobe2sdqdqvvl/44396814019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://schreinerheusi.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160853b5943189---27444322585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bertoniamministrazione.it/bertoni/public/file/99583341998.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhbanglaw.com/userfiles/file/pujipokajirazim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cfo-search.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160848be5d769c---12318833821.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.generalutilities.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16077f0889062b---vumalutiwimuwaxepeda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kompletucetnictvi.cz/files/file/64833055495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://accesoriosalmayor.com/images/userfiles/file/93144390089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://colafranceschi.it/userfiles/files/sevubuwidez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.goldenplanet.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085208ec5581---xukufonalojuwuwuduno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://socialacademy.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/28607f1a5503d00bfeb9f07d273a524d/80973369416.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a912ea0cf1e---50218216648.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://shared401k.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2db0486711a49634fee264292e34d73c/luvuxidib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010f86.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10F86 16812 bytes
SHA-256: d6132e4285ed8bc5bd4f44989b1ac1907d80ee5f6b3fbd77044cebaa4c4faf20
font_01_sfnt_off00013b51.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13B51 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00015368.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15368 10624 bytes
SHA-256: 0fe9c0a4e85193dde27413fec1105cfd8a6d47155c13e9d1ddfb83e8c1938d5b

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