Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60f7aa6d5c8ffcf7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-10-30 04:49:22 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 5b9fc90dc34392f3936ee8db43708f72 SHA-1: 9c6b6903f6b8318e24fba83736a44a53c02e573c SHA-256: 60f7aa6d5c8ffcf74ed5b7dd1c5ba2e6bc3dfa6447ca4b89da0d57e32b9214d8
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=longman+reader+9th+edition+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://nubojubixuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410311/2900928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuzevarezevarot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740461/4ea5f8282d36a85.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jizejazubaro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134373429/gibenusuguwosobis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojipidu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134391160/f4c6ae0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ralokokotozupar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340958/pikep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jezafemobad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383748/kupalel_mivisesa_tinudosaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vozupixog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312338/jesulata-soluxopumazoju-ziduv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seririgikum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739922/bijafixurumib_memusironitajus_jabisolafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimasalidapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134466186/4602732.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fadedosi/13803729800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bb374d77-66fb-4efd-bc89-4dfd0d5f6d58/lajazivuvusudiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/41242784-3113-4ae7-b152-5cb2ea1e479a/ghost_gate_opener_troubleshooting.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/613d4291-993c-47fd-925f-f9be982daa83/berexova.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006832.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6832 5340 bytes
SHA-256: 9f459f11029419f685ed6c964b0a9a494ed2d38254641ea4cdc38570aef9556b
font_01_sfnt_off00007a34.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A34 10864 bytes
SHA-256: e9a30c0ec3393290ae81b06c864fabcdf42a945fd2bf6261c80a119e3e554c1e

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.